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an easement on their land. The court noted that a request for injunctive
relief must satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement. The
court emphasized that the Shipes sought injunction from a temporary
easement as opposed to a permanent easement on their land. The court
next analyzed whether the grant of a temporary easement satisfies the
actual case or controversy requirement.
In order to meet the case or controversy requirement, an issue must
be ripe - not contingent on future action. The court reasoned that
District 25's future decision to request a permanent easement on the
Shipes' property is contingent on several factors. The court discussed
the following contingent factors: (1) whether District 25 will conclude
that the Shipes' property provides a more ample supply of water in
comparison to the other two test drill locations; (2) whether the
Division of Water Resources will approve District 25's application; (3)
whether District 25 will be able to obtain water rights in the water
related to the Shipes' property; and, if obtained; (4) whether the Shipes
will still own the land. The court concluded that the unpredictability of
these factors prevents the issues raised from being ripe, and therefore,
does not satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's decision to grant District 25's motion
to dismiss, but on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the Shipes lacked standing and the issues were not ripe.
Crystal Lay
NEBRASKA
In re 2007 Admin. of Appropriations of the Waters of the Niobrara
River, 768 N.W.2d 420 (Neb. 2009) (holding that a junior
appropriator's successful condemnation proceeding regarding a senior
appropriator's water rights does not render litigation challenging the
validity of a senior appropriator moot).
In 2006, Jack Bond and Joe McClaren Ranch ("junior appropriators")
acquired surface water appropriation rights on the Niobrara River to
use for agricultural purposes. In the spring of 2007, a senior
appropriator the Nebraska Public Power District ("NPPD"), claimed that
the Niobrara River lacked sufficient water to satisfy its appropriation
rights for a downstream hydropower facility. Claiming that it has held
surface water appropriations for the hydropower facility since 1942,
NPPD requested that the Department of Natural Resources
("Department") administer the river to ensure that NPPD's senior
appropriations rights were satisfied.
On May 1, 2007, the Department issued closing notices to
approximately 400 upstream appropriators, including the junior
appropriators Jack Bond and Joe McClaren Ranch. The closing notices
required the junior appropriators to cease water diversion so that NPPD
could satisfy its senior appropriation right. On May 11, 2007, the junior
appropriators contested the closing notices by filing an administrative
hearing request with the Department alleging that the justification for
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issuing the closing notices was void. The junior appropriators argued
that NPPD had abandoned its appropriation rights, or alternatively, that
even if NPPD had a valid appropriation right the closing notices were
futile because they would not result in any additional water reaching
NPPD's hydropower facility.
With the administrative hearing pending, the junior appropriators
filed a petition with the county court to condemn NPPD's water rights.
Under Nebraska Law, a junior appropriator with a superior preference
right may condemn a senior appropriator's water right if it pays just
compensation to the senior appropriator. Domestic users have a
superior preference over all other users, and agricultural users have a
superior preference over manufacturing and power generation users.
This policy ensures that, in times of shortage, one with an inferior
preference right cannot completely deny water access to one with
superior preference right. Because the junior appropriators were
agricultural users and NPPD used its water to generate power, the
junior appropriators had a superior preference right. Accordingly, the
county court ruled that the junior appropriators could use the water to
the detriment of NPPD for 20 years and established a compensation
award for NPPD.
After the Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed NPPD's first appeal
of the compensation award, the Department determined the junior
appropriators lacked standing and dismissed their administrative
hearing. The Department held that the junior appropriators had no
legally protected interest in the controversy that would benefit from
their requested relief because they exercised their condemnation right
and were no longer subject to an NPPD closing notice for 20 years. The
junior appropriators appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court ("court").
On appeal, NPPD filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the
condemnation proceeding had mooted the junior appropriator's
appropriation controversy, or alternatively, that the junior
appropriators were seeking a double recovery and were therefore
barred under the election of remedies doctrine.
The court first clarified that mootness, not standing, was the issue in
the case. The court noted that the junior appropriators could not lose
standing so long as they had a personal stake in the outcome of the
dispute when they commenced the litigation. Because the Department
has jurisdiction over water appropriation disputes and no one alleged
that the junior appropriators lacked a personal stake in the dispute at
the time they filed their petition, the court ruled that standing was not at
issue and went on to analyze the issue of mootness.
Mootness, the court noted, refers to events occurring after the
commencement of the litigation that eradicate a party's personal stake
in the outcome of the dispute. Although the junior appropriators
successfully condemned NPPD's water rights, the Department still
required them to compensate NPPD for any water they diverted.
Because the junior appropriators could stop reimbursing NPPD if the
Department determined that NPPD had abandoned its 1942
appropriation, the court reasoned that the junior appropriators still had
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a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the dispute. Therefore,
the court held that the case was not moot.
The court next addressed NPPD's election of remedies argument.
The election of remedies doctrine aims to prevent a plaintiff from
receiving double recovery by asserting several claims or seeking
inconsistent remedies. However, the court noted that the junior
appropriators were not seeking inconsistent remedies or double
recovery but merely enforcing separate rights by invoking their senior
preference right and challenging the validity of NPPD's appropriation
status. Nothing in the condemnations proceedings precludes a junior
appropriator who is invoking its senior preference right from also
challenging the validity of the senior appropriation right. Were it
otherwise, the court reasoned, junior appropriators would have to
relinquish their constitutional preference rights to challenge the validity
of a senior appropriation right. The court reasoned NPPD's election of
remedies argument called for a result inconsistent with the Nebraska
Constitution and was without merit.
Because the junior appropriators still had a legally cognizable
interest in the administrative hearing and were not seeking double
recovery but enforcing separate rights, the court remanded the case to
the Department for further proceedings.
Michael Eden
OREGON
Gienger v. Dep't of State Lands, 214 P.3d 75 (Or. App. 2009) (holding
that a creek is a "water of the state" and that unpermitted removal of
material from the bed and banks of the creek is a violation of section
196.810 of the Oregon Revised Statutes).
Lenhart Gienger ("Gienger"), a dairy farmer, owns land through
which Golf Course., Creek ("creek") runs. In January 2004, Gienger
removed fifty cubic yards of material from the bed and banks of the
creek. The Department of Fish and Wildlife ("department") investigated
the excavation site and observed several hundred cubic yards of
material removed from the banks of the creek. The department issued
Gienger a cease and desist order, and, in a proposed order, fined him for
unpermitted removal of material from the creek. In a contested case
hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALI") issued a proposed order
finding that, although the creek was a "water of the state" under section
196.810 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, the creek was exempt from the
permit requirement pursuant to section 196.905(3), (4), and (6). The
department disagreed, issued a final order in which it added an
additional finding of fact, and concluded that no exemption from the
permit requirement applied. Gienger sought judicial review of the final
order before the Court of Appeals of Oregon ("court").
Gienger raised five assignments of error to the department's final
order. First, he contended that the department's additional factual
finding (that although the creek has been channelized and relocated

